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Abstract
Employment creation has dropped oﬀ   the direct agenda of most central banks. Th   e so-called “global 
best practice” approach to central banking has not focused on economic growth or employment 
generation but rather on keeping inﬂ  ation in the low single digits. However, the policy record shows 
that employment generation and economic growth are often not by-products of inﬂ  ation focused 
central bank policy. Th   is chapter argues that there should be a return to the historical norm of 
central bank policy in which employment creation and more rapid economic growth join inﬂ  ation 
and stabilization more generally as key goals of central bank policy. Supporting this argument, the 
chapter summarizes major lessons of a multi-country research project undertaken by an international 
team of economists which show that, within the constraints of contemporary economic conditions, 
there are viable alternatives to inﬂ  ation targeting that can focus more on important social, real sector 
outcomes such as employment generation and poverty reduction.
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Ironically, employment creation has dropped oﬀ   the direct agenda of most central banks just as the prob-
lems of global unemployment, underemployment and poverty are taking centre stage as critical world issues 
(Heintz, 2006a). Th   e ILO estimates that in 2003, approximately 186 million people were jobless, the highest 
level ever recorded (ILO, 2004a). Th   e employment to population ratio—a measure of unemployment—has 
fallen in the last decade, from 63.3 per cent to 62.5 per cent (ILO, 2004b). And as the quantity of jobs rela-
tive to need has fallen, there is also a signiﬁ  cant global problem with respect to the quality of jobs. Th  e  ILO 
estimates that 22 per cent of the developing world’s workers earn less than $1 a day and 1.38 billion (or 57 
per cent of the developing world’s workers) earn less than $2 a day. To reach the Millennium Development 
Goal of halving the share of working poor by 2015, sustained, robust economic growth will be required. Th  e 
ILO estimates that, on average, real GDP growth has to be maintained at 4.7 per cent per year to reduce the 
share of $1 a day poverty by half by 2015, and signiﬁ  cantly more than that to reduce the share of $2 a day 
poverty by half. According to the ILO, “of the seven regions under consideration in this paper, only the three 
Asian regions and the Middle East and North Africa region appear on track to meet the $1 target, and East 
Asia is the only region on track to reduce $2 working poverty by half” (Kapsos, 2004: v; Heintz, 2006a). 
In addition, IMF economists estimate that economic growth needs to be sustained at 7 per cent per year or 
more to reach the Millennium Development Goal of reducing poverty by half by 2015 (IMF, 2005: 8).
Yet, for the past decade or more, the so-called ‘global best practice’ approach to central banking has 
not focused on economic growth or employment generation; instead, it pursues formal or informal ‘inﬂ  a-
tion-targeting’, in which keeping a low rate of inﬂ  ation—in the low single digits—has been proposed as the 
dominant and often exclusive target of monetary policy. In this inﬂ  ation-focused monetary policy, other 
important goals, such as rapid economic growth and employment creation, are seen as inappropriate direct 
targets of central bank policy; rather, they are viewed as hoped for—even presumed—by-products of an 
inﬂ  ation focused approach to monetary policy (Allen, Baumgartner and Rajan, 2006). Th   us, according to 
this orthodox approach to monetary policy, the focus of policy is on ‘stabilization’, rather than ‘growth’ or 
‘development’, with an implicit assumption that once ‘stabilization’ is achieved, economic growth, employ-
ment creation, and poverty reduction will follow.
Th   is orthodox view not only speciﬁ  es the appropriate target of monetary policy, but also the appro-
priate tools or instruments. Th   e orthodox approach has emphasized indirect, market-based instruments of 
policy, such as short term interest rates, as the primary and often exclusive tool of monetary policy (Mas-
son, Savastano and Sharma, 1997). Th   is is in contrast to the ‘direct’, quantitative tools often used by central 
banks which have involved credit allocation methods, interest rate ceilings, and other ways to direct credit 
to priority economic sectors and goals. In short, the orthodox approach has narrowed both the goals and the 
tools of monetary policy.
1 Th   e author thanks José Antonio Ocampo and Jomo K.S. for help, and all the members of the PERI/Bilkent 
Alternatives to Inﬂ  ation Targeting Project, and PERI colleagues, including Robert Pollin, James Heintz, Leonce 
Ndikumana, Erinc Yeldan, Roberto Frenkel, and Arjun Jayadev, for many helpful discussions and Lynda Pickbourn for 
excellent research assistance. I also thank the funders of the PERI/Bilkent Alternatives to Inﬂ  ation Targeting project, 
including UN-DESA, Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Brothers Fund and PERI for their support. Of course, remaining 
errors are mine alone.2  DESA Working Paper No. 38
After several decades of experience with this inﬂ  ation-focused –market-based approach, the policy 
record has been rather disappointing for many countries. In a number of countries, inﬂ  ation has come down, 
to be sure, but it is questionable to what extent the drop in inﬂ  ation is due to changes in domestic monetary 
policy, rather than the overall global fall in inﬂ  ation (Ball and Sheridan, 2003; Roger and Stone, 2005). But 
even if domestic monetary policy has reduced inﬂ  ation, the hoped for gains in employment have, generally, 
not materialized; and, for many countries following this orthodox approach, economic growth has not sig-
niﬁ  cantly increased. Th   e key point, then, is this: despite what the orthodox approach maintains, employment 
generation and economic growth, are not automatic by-products of ‘stabilization-focused’ central bank policy.
Yet, surprisingly, despite a disappointing record, this almost single-minded focus on inﬂ  ation is gain-
ing a more secure foothold in monetary policy circles, and the circles are widening to include an increasing 
number of developing countries. Th   is is occurring even as inﬂ  ation becomes less and less of a global problem 
while unemployment and underemployment become increasingly dire. According to a recent report by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), an increasing number of central banks in emerging markets are plan-
ning to adopt inﬂ  ation targeting as their operating framework (see Table 1). An IMF staﬀ   survey of 88 non-
industrial countries found that more than half expressed a desire to move to explicit or implicit quantitative 
inﬂ  ation targets. More relevant to our concerns, nearly three-quarters of these countries expressed an interest 
in moving to ‘full-ﬂ  edged’ inﬂ  ation targeting by 2010 (Allen, Baumgartner and Rajan, 2006: 8). To support 
and encourage this movement, the IMF is providing technical assistance (TA) to many of these countries and 
is willing to provide more (Table 5.1, and further discussion below). In addition, the IMF is considering al-
tering its conditionality and monitoring structures to include inﬂ  ation targets. In short, despite little evidence 
concerning the success of inﬂ  ation targeting in its promotion of economic growth, employment creation and 
poverty reduction, and mixed evidence at best that it actually reduces inﬂ  ation itself, a substantial momen-
tum is building up for full ﬂ  edged inﬂ  ation targeting in developing countries. Promotion eﬀ  orts by the IMF 
and western-trained economists are at least partly responsible for this increasing popularity.
While it might seem obvious that price stabilization-focused central bank policy represents the only 
proper role for central banks, in fact, looking at history casts serious doubt on this claim. Far from being the 
historical norm, this focus by central banks on price stabilization to the exclusion of development represents 
a sharp break from historical practice, not just in the developing world, but also in the now developed coun-
tries as well (Epstein, 2006b). In many of the successful currently developed countries, as well as in many 
developing countries in the post-Second World War period, development was seen as a crucial part of the 
central bank’s tasks. Now, by contrast, development and employment has dropped oﬀ   the priority ‘to do’ list 
of central banks in most developing countries.
Th   e theme of this chapter is that there should be a return to the historical norm of central bank poli-
cy: in particular, employment creation and more rapid economic growth should join inﬂ  ation and stabiliza-
tion more generally as key goals of central bank policy. Th   is chapter outlines why a shift away from inﬂ  ation 
targeting, the increasingly fashionable, but extremist and destructive approach to central bank policy and a 
move back toward a more balanced approach is both feasible and desirable. Of course, the paper does NOT 
argue that stabilization, including a moderate inﬂ  ation rate, is unimportant. Indeed, historically, some cen-
tral banks went much too far in downplaying the stabilization role, sometimes with disastrous consequences. 
But this does not mean that the optimal policy is to go to the other extreme and ignore the developmental 
role entirely. As I try to show in this paper, balancing between the price stabilization and developmental roles 
is both desirable and feasible for many central banks. In this context, for many countries, a focus on employ-
ment creation is a desirable goal of monetary policy. Central banks as agents of employment creation          3
Of course, central banks need not, and indeed, cannot be the only institution having an employment 
generation role. But, in most developing countries, central banks need to cooperate with other institutions 
by doing much more than simply keeping inﬂ  ation rates in the low single digits. To bring this about, many 
institutions will have to play a supporting role. Among them is the IMF, which by modifying its conditional-
ity and monitoring program approach is enshrining inﬂ  ation control as a dominant policy. Th   e IMF should 
Table 1.
Infl  ation targeting countries, current and potential
Country When adopted
Current Infl  ation target 
(% p. a.)
Technical Assistance 
requested from and 
given by IMF
Current Targeters (in order of adoption)
Emerging Markets
Israel 1997 1-3
Czech Republic 1998 3 (+/- 1)
Poland 1998 2.5 (+/- 1)
Brazil 1999 4.5 (+/- 2)
Chile 1999 2-4
Colombia 1999 5 (+/- .5)
South Africa 2000 3-6
Thailand 2000 0 – 3.5
Korea 2001 2.5-3.5
Mexico 2001 3 (+/-1)
Hungary 2001 3.5 (+/-1)
Peru 2002 2.5 (+/-1)
Philippines 2002 5-6
Slovak Rep. 2005 3.5 (+/- 1)
Indonesia 2005 5.5 (+/- 1)
Romania 2005 8.8
Industrial Countries
New Zealand 1990 1-3
Canada 1991 1-3
United Kingdom 1992 2




Candidates for Infl  ation Targeting
Costa Rica, Egypt, Turkey, Ukraine (4) Near Term:
1-2 years
Yes
Albania, Armenia, Botswana Dominican Republic, 









Belarus, China, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, 
Serbia, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Zambia (9)
Long term:
more than 5 years Yes
Bolivia, Honduras, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, 
Sudan, Tunisia, Uruguay, Venezuela (8) No
Source: Allen, Baumgartner and Rajan (2006: Tables 1, 2).4  DESA Working Paper No. 38
change its advice to a more balanced position between inﬂ  ation control and employment generation and 
poverty reduction.
Th   e rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we brieﬂ  y survey the current 
structure and impacts of inﬂ  ation focused monetary policy, including a discussion of inﬂ  ation targeting. Th  e 
third section discusses alternatives to inﬂ  ation-focused central banks, concentrating on the results of a multi-
country research project. Th   is section shows that there are viable, socially productive alternatives to inﬂ  ation 
targeting, including those that focus on employment generation, and make the case that these alternatives 
should be further developed. Th   e fourth and penultimate section discusses the historical practice of central 
banking in developed and developing countries, and, in particular, its developmental role. Th  e  ﬁ  nal section 
concludes. 
Structure, Promise and Impacts of Inﬂ  ation Focused Monetary Policy
According to its advocates, ‘full ﬂ  edged’ inﬂ  ation targeting consists of ﬁ  ve components: absence of other 
nominal anchors, such as exchange rates or nominal GDP; an institutional commitment to price stability; 
absence of ﬁ  scal dominance; policy (instrument) independence; and policy transparency and accountability 
(Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001: 3; Bernanke and others, 1999). In practice, while few central banks 
reach the ‘ideal’ of being ‘full ﬂ  edged’ inﬂ  ation targeters, many others still focus on ﬁ  ghting inﬂ  ation to the 
virtual exclusion of other goals. Th   e overriding announced goal of inﬂ  ation targeting central banks is typical-
ly ‘price stability’, usually deﬁ  ned to be an inﬂ  ation rate in the low single digits (Bernanke and others, 1999: 
99). In addition, inﬂ  ation targeting is usually associated with changes in the law that enhance the indepen-
dence of the central bank (Bernanke and others, 1999: 102; Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001: 8).
Th   e major claims made by advocates of inﬂ  ation targeting are that it will2:
Reduce the rate of inﬂ  ation • 
Enhance the credibility of monetary policy • 
Reduce the  •  sacriﬁ  ce ratio associated with contractionary monetary policy
Help to attract foreign investment • 
Th   e evidence on these claims is mainly in the negative. It is true that countries that adopt inﬂ  ation 
targeting often achieve lower inﬂ  ation rates. But there is strong evidence that this decline in inﬂ  ation might 
not be due to inﬂ  ation targeting itself, but rather to the general decline in worldwide inﬂ  ation or to a simple 
reversion to a more normal inﬂ  ation rate (Ball and Sheridan, 2003; for a contrary view, though, see Allen, 
Baumgartner and Sharma, 2006, further discussed below). In addition, most evidence indicates that inﬂ  a-
tion targeting central banks do not reduce inﬂ  ation at any lower cost than other countries’ central banks in 
terms of foregone output. Th   at is, inﬂ  ation targeting does not appear to increase the credibility of central 
bank policy and therefore, does not appear to reduce the ‘sacriﬁ  ce ratio’ (see Bernanke and others, 1999, and 
Epstein, 2000, for detailed surveys of the literature). Typically, central banks that reduce inﬂ  ation do so the 
old-fashioned way: by raising interest rates, causing recessions or slowing growth, and by throwing people 
out of work.3 Moreover, there is no evidence that countries adopting inﬂ  ation targeting manage to attract 
more usable foreign investment.
2  See Bernanke and others (1999), Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) and Roger and Stone (2005) for recent surveys. 
3  Clifton, Leon and Wong (2001) report some ﬁ  ndings that inﬂ  ation targeting might have improved the inﬂ  ation/
unemployment trade-oﬀ   in OECD countries, but they do not look at emerging market countries.Central banks as agents of employment creation          5
A recent study by IMF economists, using a complex econometric model and policy simulations, 
reports ﬁ  ndings that inﬂ  ation targeting economies experience reductions in the volatility of inﬂ  ation, without 
experiencing increased volatility in real variables such as GDP. According to these estimates, inﬂ  ation target-
ing central banks do enhance economic ‘stability’ relative to other monetary rules, such as pegged exchange 
rates and monetary rules (Allen, Baumgartner and Rajan, 2006). While intriguing, these results are only as 
strong as the simulation model on which they are based, and are only as relevant as the relevance of the ques-
tions they pose, moreover, they are only as broad as the alternatives they explore. On all these scores, these 
IMF results are problematic. First, they do not simulate the impact of inﬂ  ation targeting relative to other 
possible policy regimes, such as the real targeting regime discussed below. Second, the model is based on esti-
mates of potential output that are themselves aﬀ  ected by monetary policy (Tobin, 1980). Hence, if monetary 
policy slows economic growth, it also lowers the rate of growth of potential output, and therefore reduces 
the gap between the two, thereby appearing to stabilize the economy. But in fact, it does so at the expense of 
slowing growth or even generating stagnation. Th   is highlights the third key point: even if it could be shown 
that inﬂ  ation targeting does a good job at stabilization, it is crucial to remember that the stabilization role of 
monetary policy is only one of the tasks facing central banks; the other task is to contribute directly to eco-
nomic growth, employment creation and poverty reduction, and the IMF study fails to look at the impact of 
inﬂ  ation targeting on the rate of growth of employment, or on the quality of employment. Yet, these are the 
issues at stake here.
Asymmetries and Misses in Inﬂ  ation Targeting Regimes
Experiences with inﬂ  ation targeting present another odd feature: inﬂ  ation targets are frequently missed, and 
often by a great margin. Moreover, inﬂ  ation rates are just as likely to be too low as too high, and sometimes, 
more so (see Table 2). In other words, monetary policy is often more likely to be too tight than too loose. 
Yet, despite often missing the targets, countries 
which have adopted inﬂ  ation targeting do not 
give it up. Th   is presents several asymmetries 
which are possibly costly for employment and 
growth. If under inﬂ  ation targeting, inﬂ  ation 
is often too low, that means that central banks 
may be keeping monetary policy too tight, with 
possible negative implications for employment 
and growth. Second, why do countries con-
tinue to adopt inﬂ  ation targeting even though 
the targets are often missed? With a stunningly 
Panglossian faith, IMF economists surmise: 
“Th   ese misses do not seem to reﬂ  ect ‘bad’ mon-
etary policy; otherwise, the regime would surely have been abandoned or substantially modiﬁ  ed” (Roger and 
Stone, 2005: 37). 4
Another more likely interpretation is that once countries adopt inﬂ  ation targeting, they are locked 
into it. Th   ey feel they cannot abandon it for fear that abandoning inﬂ  ation targeting will send the ‘wrong’ 
signal to investors and could prove costly in terms of ‘investor conﬁ  dence’, leading perhaps to exchange rate 
4 Th  ey  oﬀ  er an alternative answer as well: “Another way to answer this question is to note the lack of alternative regimes” 
(Roger and Stone, 2005: 38). I will discuss this point more below.
Table 2.
Infl  ation outcomes of infl  ation targeting countries
Frequency of Deviations (%)
Total Below Above
All Countries 43.5 24.2 19.3
Stable Infl  ation Targets 32.2 21.7 10.6
Disinfl  ation Targets 59.7 27.7 10.6
Industrial Countries 34.8 22.5 12.3
Emerging Market Countries 52.2 25.9 26.2
Source: Roger and Stone (2005: 22, Table 7).
Note: Th   ese outcomes are measured relative to the edges of target 
ranges.6  DESA Working Paper No. 38
instability and capital ﬂ  ight. If this ‘fear of inﬂ  ation’ is true, then countries maintain the inﬂ  ation targeting 
framework, even if they often miss the targets.
Some might argue that this means an inﬂ  ation targeting regime is a ‘paper tiger’, and that it there-
fore cannot have signiﬁ  cant eﬀ  ects for good or ill. But I believe this is a mistaken interpretation. For one 
thing, as just mentioned, inﬂ  ation targeters are just as likely, if not more likely, to have a monetary policy 
that is too tight in the sense that inﬂ  ation is too low. But second, as long as central banks have an inﬂ  ation 
targeting framework, they can argue that they do not need to worry about other objectives except insofar as 
they aﬀ  ect inﬂ  ation. But, of course, this absolves central banks entirely of their developmental obligations, 
and eliminates a key tool of macroeconomic policy from the developmental arsenal that attempts to expand 
good jobs, among other goals. Inﬂ  ation targeting central banks can simply say: “Employment creation? 
Th   at’s not MY department!”
Pre-requisites for Inﬂ  ation Targeting
Even if it could be shown that, in theory, inﬂ  ation targeting or inﬂ  ation focused central bank policy are the 
appropriate policy for countries that could undertake such a regime, there is still the question of whether a 
country has the ability to successfully undertake inﬂ  ation targeting. Th   is issue has typically gone under the 
rubric of whether countries satisfy the structural and institutional ‘pre-requisites’ for inﬂ  ation targeting. 
Th   ere has been a substantial evolution in the IMF’s attitude toward this question in recent years. 
Masson, Savastano and Sharma, (1997), in a widely cited IMF working paper, argued that the institutional 
pre-requisites for successful inﬂ  ation targeting were: 1) the ability to carry out an independent monetary 
policy, that is free of ﬁ  scal dominance, or a commitment to another nominal anchor, like the exchange rate, 
and 2) a quantitative framework linking policy instruments, such as a short term interest rate, to inﬂ  ation. 
Th   ey concluded that: “Th   ese pre-requisites are largely absent among developing countries, though several of 
them could with some further institutional changes and an overriding commitment to low inﬂ  ation make 
use of an IT framework” (Masson, Savastano and Sharma, 1997: 1). Th   is is not exactly a ringing endorse-
ment of the possibilities of successful inﬂ  ation targeting in the developing world.5 
Fast forward ten years and one gets a very diﬀ  erent assessment from IMF economists. In an IMF 
report, ‘Inﬂ  ation Targeting and the IMF’, IMF economists revisit this question in a section entitled ‘Are De-
veloping Countries Good Candidates for Inﬂ  ation Targeting?’ Here, the IMF argues that the pre-requisites 
are too rigid and agree with those who argue that the “list of initial conditions is not meant to constitute 
strict prerequisites for IT” (IMF, 2006: 17). Th   e IMF claims that: “Our ﬁ  ndings also suggest the need for a 
more nuanced, less ‘mechanical’ view of necessary, as opposed to desirable, conditions for successful adop-
tion of inﬂ  ation targeting” (p. 17).
Hence, there has clearly been a shift in focus by the IMF, from raising serious concerns about 
whether inﬂ  ation targeting is appropriate for most developing countries, to a view that suggests that virtually 
any central bank can adopt targets if the government simply has the “will to make it so”. Th   is implies a much 
stronger advocacy of inﬂ  ation targeting by the IMF than seemed apparent in the past. Th   is is also reﬂ  ected in 
the IMF’s changing views on conditionality.
5  Eichengreen and others (1999) and Eichengreen (2002), among other economists, have concurred with Masson, 
Savastano and Sharma (1997). Central banks as agents of employment creation          7
Inﬂ  ation Targeting and IMF Conditionality
As indicated above, the promotion of inﬂ  ation targeting has implications for the type of conditionality the 
IMF imposes in conjunction with its lending programs. As the IMF states, “Conditionality in Fund-sup-
ported programs is intended primarily to ensure that Fund resources are used to support adjustment toward 
sustained external viability, and thereby to safeguard the capacity to repay the Fund. Traditionally, mon-
etary conditionality consists of limits on monetary aggregates—speciﬁ  cally, a ﬂ  oor is set for the level of net 
international reserves (NIR) and a ceiling is established on the net domestic assets (NDA) or on base money” 
(IMF, 2006).
Th   e IMF is concerned, however, that this NDA-NIR approach could allow for higher inﬂ  ation than 
they might like, if, for example, larger than necessary increases in net international reserves result from inﬂ  ows 
of capital (see Epstein and Heintz, 2006; Allen, Baumgartner and Rajan, 2006). As a result, inﬂ  ation target-
ing might require a further tightening of monetary conditions for countries undergoing IMF programs in 
order to maintain inﬂ  ation rates in the low single digits. To the extent that such tightening slows employment 
growth even further, inﬂ  ation targeting as part of IMF conditionality could have even more severe impacts on 
employment and poverty impacts for developing countries than the current NDA-NIR conditionality.
Why the Focus on Inﬂ  ation?
Th   ere is a further, more basic problem with inﬂ  ation targeting and the neo-liberal approach to central bank 
policy more generally. Why is there such a focus on ﬁ  ghting inﬂ  ation to the exclusion of other goals? As re-
ported in Bruno and Easterly (1998) and Epstein (2000), there is a great deal of evidence that moderate rates 
of inﬂ  ation, inﬂ  ation up to 20 per cent or even more, has no predictable negative consequences on the real 
economy: it is not associated with slower growth, reduced investment, less foreign direct investment, or any 
other important real variable that one can ﬁ  nd. 
Some IMF economists and others have argued more recently that earlier results are misleading. 
Th   ey claim that there are non-linearities, such as threshold eﬀ  ects, that imply that inﬂ  ation begins to harm 
economic growth at much lower levels than claimed by Bruno (1995) and others (Ghosh and Phillips, 1998; 
Kahn and Senhadji, 2001; Burdekin and others, 2004). Some of these ﬁ  nd that inﬂ  ation begins to harm 
growth in developing countries at rates as low as 3 per cent. However, an even more recent paper by Pollin 
and Zhu (2006) ﬁ  nds that, taking into account non-linear impacts of inﬂ  ation on economic growth, inﬂ  a-
tion and economic growth are sometimes positively related, especially when the cause of inﬂ  ation is demand 
expansion. More generally, they ﬁ  nd that for developing countries, inﬂ  ation below about 15 per cent is not 
harmful for economic growth, and can, indeed be beneﬁ  cial (Pollin and Zhu, 2006: 606). Hence, they con-
clude that, there is little justiﬁ  cation, at least on growth grounds, to focus the economy on bringing inﬂ  ation 
down to the low single digits, especially if such policy has economic costs.
Apart from growth eﬀ  ects, however, many economists have argued that inﬂ  ation harms the poor 
more than the rich. Hence, on distribution grounds, inﬂ  ation reduction into the low single digits should be 
a priority. While more research is necessary to fully investigate this claim, important recent work by Jaya-
dev (2006a, 2006b) calls this conventional wisdom into question. Jayadev looks at survey data on people’s 
preferences about inﬂ  ation versus unemployment. Whereas previous researchers had asked if people dis-
liked inﬂ  ation, Jayadev investigated the more appropriate question: which is a bigger problem—inﬂ  ation or 8  DESA Working Paper No. 38
unemployment? Th   is question better reﬂ  ects the idea that there is a trade-oﬀ   between the two, at least in the 
short to medium term. When people are asked this trade-oﬀ   question, interesting and highly relevant results 
emerge. Jayadev (2006a) ﬁ  nds that those in the lowest quintile of the income distribution are more likely to 
perceive unemployment as a more serious problem than inﬂ  ation, while those in the top quintile are more 
likely to have the opposite view. Jayadev (2006b) ﬁ  nds similar results when he divides the sample by classes, 
rather than by income groups. He ﬁ  nds that workers, and in particular, low-skilled workers, on average, ﬁ  nd 
unemployment a more serious problem than inﬂ  ation (Jayadev, 2006b).
Of course, all agree that very high levels of inﬂ  ation, above 40 per cent, can have very serious im-
pacts on growth and, possibly, the distribution of income. But there appears to be very little justiﬁ  cation for 
monetary policy oriented toward keeping inﬂ  ation in the low single digits, especially when employment and 
poverty are signiﬁ  cant problems.
In addition to these concerns, Braunstein and Heintz (2006) ﬁ  nd that dis-inﬂ  ationary monetary 
policy in developing countries, like that undertaken in connection with inﬂ  ation-focused monetary policy 
regimes, has a disproportionately negative employment eﬀ  ect on women, relative to men. Th  eir  excellent 
work is highly suggestive that there may be important gender eﬀ  ects of monetary policy, suggesting that this 
area needs much more research than it is currently receiving.
Central Bank Policy for Employment Creation
One reason that ‘inﬂ  ation-focused monetary policy’ has gained so many adherents is the common percep-
tion that there is no viable alternative monetary policy that can improve growth and employment prospects. 
Th   ere are three main factors accounting for this perception. First, many economists believe the pre-Keynes-
ian natural rate—or, alternatively, the ‘non-accelerating inﬂ  ation rate of unemployment’ (NAIRU)—view 
of the labour market that claims that, left to their own devices, market forces will automatically bring the 
economy to full employment and, furthermore, any attempt to reduce unemployment further will only 
result in ever worsening inﬂ  ation. 
However, there is substantial evidence that the NAIRU theory is not empirically well based. Th  e 
natural rate, or NAIRU, if it exists, does not seem to be constant; importantly, it seems to be aﬀ  ected by 
macroeconomic policy itself; in some countries, its eﬀ  ects are asymmetric, with increases in unemployment 
reducing inﬂ  ation, but reductions in unemployment not increasing inﬂ  ation; and it no longer even seems 
central to the work of mainstream economics (see Eisner, 1997; Baker, 2000; Ball and Sheridan, 2003; Ball 
and Mankiw, 2002; Pollin, 2005; Hall, 2005). 
Second, in an internationally ﬁ  nancially integrated economy with high levels of international capital 
ﬂ  ows, monetary policy can be extremely challenging. In particular, it might be very diﬃ   cult to gear mon-
etary policy by targeting monetary aggregates, or by pegging an exchange rate along with trying to promote 
employment growth. Th   is is often seen as the so-called ‘trilemma’ which says that central banks can only 
have two out of three of the following: open capital markets, ﬁ  xed exchange rates, and an autonomous mon-
etary policy geared toward domestic goals. While this so-called ‘trilemma’ is not strictly true as a theoretical 
matter, in practice, it does raise serious issues of monetary management (Frenkel and Taylor, 2006). From 
my perspective, the real crux of the problem turns out to be one leg of this ‘trilemma’, namely the fact that 
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and that virtually complete ﬁ  nancial liberalization with respect to the foreign sector is the optimal policy. 
Yet, recent evidence amply shows that open capital markets can create very costly problems for developing 
countries and that many successful developing countries have used a variety of capital management tech-
niques to manage these ﬂ  ows in order, among other things, to help them escape this so-called ‘trilemma’ 
(Prasad and others, 2003; Ocampo, 2002 ; Epstein, Grabel and Jomo, 2005). 
Th   ird, few economists have developed and proposed concrete alternatives to inﬂ  ation targeting 
monetary policy in the current context, so those searching for alternatives have trouble ﬁ  nding models. Th  ere 
is some truth to this last point, but economists are in the process of rectifying this problem, and I report on 
these eﬀ  orts in this section. Th   e main point of this section is this: there are viable alternatives to inﬂ  ation-fo-
cused monetary policy (including inﬂ  ation targeting), alternatives that can promote more and better employ-
ment and poverty reduction. Moreover, these alternatives are also responsive to the needs to keep inﬂ  ation at 
a moderate level and to maintain an exchange rate that is not excessively volatile: in short, these alternatives 
are responsive to stabilization needs as well as developmental needs.
In this section, I report on country studies undertaken by a team of researchers working on a 
PERI/Bilkent project on alternatives to inﬂ  ation targeting, as well as a United Nations (UN) sponsored 
study of employment targeting economic policy for South Africa.6 Th   e countries covered in this project are 
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, India, Th   e Philippines, South Africa, Turkey, and Viet Nam. As will be illustrated 
by these studies, one size does not ﬁ  t all. A range of alternatives were developed in these papers, all the way 
from modest changes in the inﬂ  ation targeting framework to allow for more focus on exchange rates and a 
change in the index of inﬂ  ation used, to a much broader change in the overall mandate of the central bank 
to a focus on employment targeting, rather than inﬂ  ation targeting. Some of the alternative policies focus ex-
clusively on changes in central bank policy, while for other countries, changes in the broad policy framework 
and in the interactions of monetary, ﬁ  nancial and ﬁ  scal policy are proposed. Some incorporate explicit goals 
and targets, while others prefer more ﬂ  exibility and somewhat less transparency. But all the studies agreed 
that the responsibilities of central banks, particularly in developing countries, while including maintaining 
a moderate rate of inﬂ  ation, must be broader than that, and should include other crucial ‘real’ variables that 
have a direct impact on employment, poverty and economic growth, such as the real exchange rate, employ-
ment, or investment.7 Th   ey also agree that in many cases, central banks must broaden their available policy 
tools to allow them to reach multiple goals, including, if necessary, the implementation of capital account 
management techniques (Ocampo, 2002 ; Epstein, Grabel and Jomo, 2005).
Alternatives to Inﬂ  ation Targeting: Variations on a Th  eme
Modest, but Useful Adjustments to the Inﬂ  ation Targeting Regime 
Some of the country studies in the PERI/Bilkent project proposed only modest changes to the inﬂ  ation 
targeting regime. In the case of Mexico, for example, the authors argue that the inﬂ  ation targeting regime 
has allowed for more ﬂ  exible monetary policy than had occurred under regimes with strict monetary targets 
or strict exchange rate targets (Galindo and Ros, 2006). Th   ey suggest modifying the IT framework to make 
6  For the PERI/Bilkent project, see Epstein and Yeldan (eds), forthcoming; and Pollin and others (2006).
7  It is true that so-called ‘Taylor Rules’ that estimate policy rules governing monetary policy often ﬁ  nd that central 
banks react to the deviation between ‘potential output’ and actual output (the ‘output gap’), but, far from implying 
that central banks care about unemployment, these results can be justiﬁ  ed by noting that the output gap aﬀ  ects future 
inﬂ  ation, so the central bank focusing solely on inﬂ  ation might still be concerned with the output gap (Eichengreen, 
2002).10  DESA Working Paper No. 38
it somewhat more employment friendly. In the case of Mexico, Galindo and Ros ﬁ  nd that monetary policy 
was asymmetric with respect to exchange rate movements—tightening when exchange rates depreciated, but 
not loosening when exchange rates appreciated. Th   is lent a bias in favour of an over-valued exchange rate in 
Mexico. So Galindo and Ros (2006) propose a ‘neutral’ monetary policy so that the central bank of Mexico 
responds symmetrically to exchange rate movements and thereby avoids the bias toward over-valuation with-
out fundamentally changing the inﬂ  ation targeting framework.8 
In his study of Brazil, Nelson Barbosa-Filho also proposed extending the inﬂ  ation targeting frame-
work, but as we will see shortly, in a more dramatic way. He writes “because of Brazil’s past experience with 
high inﬂ  ation, the best policy is to continue to target inﬂ  ation while the economy moves to a more stable 
macroeconomic situation. So far the great gain from inﬂ  ation targeting has been the increase in the transpar-
ency and accountability of monetary policy in Brazil” (Barbosa-Filho, 2006). But he goes on to say, “Th  e 
crucial question is not to eliminate inﬂ  ation targeting, but actually make it compatible with fast income 
growth and a stable public and foreign ﬁ  nance” (Barbosa-Filho, 2006). As discussed in the next section, in 
order to do that, Barbosa-Filho joins a number of the country case study authors in proposing a monetary 
policy to maintain a stable and competitive real exchange rate (SCRER) which, they argue, will have a 
number of signiﬁ  cant beneﬁ  ts for many of these economies and their peoples.
A Competitive and Stable Real Exchange Rate
As just indicated, a number of authors, following the lead of Frenkel and Taylor (2006), Frenkel and Ros 
(2006) and Frenkel and Rapetti (2006), argue that central bank should maintain a moderate inﬂ  ation rate 
and should maintain a competitive and stable real exchange rate. Th   ey note that the real exchange rate can 
aﬀ  ect employment, and the economy more generally, through a number of channels: (1) By aﬀ  ecting the 
level of aggregate demand (the macroeconomic channel) (2) By aﬀ  ecting the cost of labour relative to other 
goods, and thereby aﬀ  ecting the amount of labour hired per unit of output (the labour intensity channel) 
and by aﬀ  ecting employment through its impact on investment and economic growth (the development 
channel) (e.g. Frenkel and Ros, 2006: 634-637). While the size and even direction of these channel eﬀ  ects 
might diﬀ  er from country to country, in many countries, including countries in Latin America, maintain-
ing a competitive and stable real exchange rate is likely to have a positive employment impact through some 
combination of these eﬀ  ects. For example, Frenkel and Ros ﬁ  nd that most Latin American countries experi-
encing increases in unemployment in the 1990s, were characterized by signiﬁ  cant appreciations in their real 
exchange rate. As Frenkel and Rapetti (2006) show, following the economic crisis in Argentina, maintaining 
a competitive real exchange rate has proven to have a strong positive impact on the recovery in employment.
From the point of view of monetary policy, the challenge is how to design a policy to maintain a 
stable and competitive real exchange rate (SCRER) so that it does not get undermined by massive speculative 
capital ﬂ  ows. Th   e danger is that if the markets see the central bank trying to manipulate the exchange rate, 
then the exchange rate will be subject to attacks and such attacks will undermine the ability of the central 
bank to prevent the currency from excessively appreciating or depreciating (Frenkel and Rapetti, 2006; Fren-
kel and Taylor, 2006).
First, it should be noted that many developing countries already take exchange rate movements into 
account when formulating monetary policy, including implementation of inﬂ  ation targeting (e.g. Ho and 
8  Galindo and Ros (2006) also propose shifting from a CPI target to a domestic inﬂ  ation target which would purge the 
exchange rate impact on the ‘target’ inﬂ  ation rate and further reduce the basis for the monetary policy bias toward 
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McCauley, 2003). So, the so-called bi-polar view of exchange rate regimes—in which countries either have 
perfectly ﬂ  oating exchange rates or adopt a foreign currency or a currency board as a ‘hard peg’—does not 
seem accurate. Most developing countries ﬁ  nd themselves having to manage their exchange rates to some 
degree or other. Ho and McCauley point out that many of these countries, especially many of the success 
stories of East Asia, use capital account management techniques to help them maintain a stable and competi-
tive exchange rate.
Second, central banks can, and do, adopt various types of capital controls and other types of capi-
tal account management techniques, to help manage exchange rates in the face of speculative capital ﬂ  ows 
(Ocampo, 2002; Epstein, Grabel, Jomo, 2005). Th   is is an example where central banks may need to expand 
their range of policy tools in order to incorporate multiple targets.
In the PERI/Bilkent project, a number of country study authors proposed a new framework for 
central banks in which they should include a “stable and competitive real exchange rate” (SCRER) as an 
“intermediate goal”. Th   ese countries included Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, the Philippines and Viet Nam (see 
Frenkel and Rapetti, 2006; Barbosa-Filho, 2006; Galindo and Ros, 2006; Lim, 2006; Packard, 2006). In all 
these cases, the authors argued that such a policy would help their economies pursue a more employment 
oriented growth path, while maintaining inﬂ  ation in check. Th   ey all suggested that the countries they stud-
ied might need to impose short-term capital controls and other capital account management techniques to 
help them manage the exchange rate while maintaining moderate inﬂ  ation.
For the case of Brazil, Barbosa-Filho (2006) developed a more elaborate policy framework which 
includes, as in the papers mentioned above, a focus on a competitive and stable real exchange rate. But, in 
addition, given Brazil’s large public debt, Barbosa-Filho also proposes that the central bank target a reduction 
in the real interest rate, which would reduce the Brazilian debt service burdens and help increase productive 
investment. In terms of the familiar targets and instruments framework, Barbosa-Filho proposes that the 
Brazilian central bank choose exports, inﬂ  ation and investment as ultimate targets, and focus on the inﬂ  ation 
rate, a competitive and stable real exchange rate and the real interest rate as intermediate targets. Barbosa-Fil-
ho also elaborates on the monetary policy tools that can be used to reach these intermediate and ultimate tar-
gets. To maintain the SCRER, Barbosa-Filho proposes an asymmetric managed ﬂ  oating exchange rate regime 
in which the Brazilian central bank places a (moving) ceiling on the appreciation of the exchange rate, and, 
when necessary implements tight macroeconomic policy to prevent speculative attacks leading to excessive 
depreciations. Th   e central bank should also attempt to lower the real interest rate. In order to achieve these 
goals, the central bank can use direct manipulation of the policy interest rate, bank reserve requirements and 
bank capital requirements (Barbosa-Filho, 2006).
Brazil is not the only highly indebted country in our project sample. Turkey is another case with that 
problem. Developing an alternative to inﬂ  ation targeting using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model for the case of Turkey, Voyvoda and Yeldan simulated the impact of a shift in policy from a strict inﬂ  a-
tion targeting regime, to one which had a focus on the competitiveness of the real exchange rate.9 Th  ey  ﬁ  nd 
that such a shift generates much more rapid growth and employment creation, but at the expense of some 
worsening of the government debt position, relative to the strict inﬂ  ation targeting and ﬁ  scal surplus regime 
currently in place (Voyvoda and Yeldan, 2006).
9  Another important change was from a primary ﬁ  scal surplus to a more relaxed ﬁ  scal stance.12  DESA Working Paper No. 38
Frenkel and Rapetti, in the case of Argentina, show that targeting a stable and competitive real 
exchange rate has been very successful in helping to maintain more rapid economic growth and employment 
generation. In the case of India, Jha also argues against an inﬂ  ation targeting regime, in favour of one that 
“errs on the side of undervaluation of the exchange rate” with possible help from temporary resort to capital 
controls (Jha, 2006: 30-31). Jha argues that, to some extent, such a policy would be a simple continuation 
of policies undertaken in India in the past. In Vietnam, Packard concludes, “a strict inﬂ  ation targeting (IT) 
regime is not appropriate for Vietnam. IT’s rigid rules constrain policymakers to operate in a framework 
that requires inﬂ  ation to take priority over more pressing development objectives…. I argue that a stable and 
competitive real exchange rate is (a) superior alternative, precisely because it sets as a target a key macroeco-
nomic relative price that is realistic, sustainable, and growth enhancing” (Packard, 2006). 
For Mexico, Galindo and Ros propose a more fundamental alternative to inﬂ  ation targeting. Th  ey 
propose combining inﬂ  ation targeting with real exchange rate targeting (Galindo and Ros, 2006). “More 
precisely, the central bank would promote a competitive exchange rate by establishing a sliding ﬂ  oor to the 
exchange rate in order to prevent excessive appreciation (an ‘asymmetric band’). Th   is would imply interven-
ing in the foreign exchange market at times when the exchange rate hits the ﬂ  oor (i.e. an appreciated ex-
change rate) but allows the exchange rate to ﬂ  oat freely otherwise” (Galindo and Ros, 2006). Th   ey point out 
that such a ﬂ  oor would work against excessive capital inﬂ  ows by speculators because they would know the 
central bank will intervene to stop excessive appreciation. If need be, Galindo and Ros also propose tempo-
rary capital controls, as do some of the other authors from the PERI/Bilkent project.
More Comprehensive Alternatives to Inﬂ  ation Targeting
Other country case studies propose more comprehensive policy alternatives to simple inﬂ  ation-focused 
monetary policy, including inﬂ  ation targeting. Joseph Lim proposes a comprehensive alternative to inﬂ  a-
tion targeting for the case of the Philippines. Lim argues that the Philippine government has been seeking 
to achieve a record of dramatically higher economic growth, but that its monetary policy has been inap-
propriate to achieving that goal. He therefore proposes an ‘alternative’ that “clearly dictates much more than 
just a move from monetary targeting to inﬂ  ation targeting”. Lim argues that any viable alternative for the 
Philippines must take into account several key constraints or realities: 1) Easier monetary policy, by itself, 
will not stimulate investment or growth because it is accompanied by weak ﬁ  nancial conﬁ  dence and stricter 
ﬁ  nancial requirements on banks. 2) Fiscal policy is highly constrained because of a large public debt. 3) High 
economic growth, by itself, will not necessarily enhance the quality of growth—i.e., improving the growth 
of good jobs with good wages. 4) Volatile external accounts and foreign exchange rates undermine rapid and 
high quality growth.
Lim’s proposals include: 1) Maintenance of a stable and competitive real exchange rate (SCRER), 
either by pegging the exchange rate or intensively managing it as in South Korea. 2) To help manage the 
exchange rate, capital account management techniques are likely to be needed. 3) Th   is should include strong 
ﬁ  nancial supervision to prevent excessive undertaking of short-term foreign debt, and tax based capital 
controls on short-term capital ﬂ  ows, as was used, for example in Chile, an explicit stating of output and 
employment goals, as the central bank transitions from a purely inﬂ  ation-targeting regime. Lim argues that 
these policies can have beneﬁ  cial impacts on the current Philippine problems of high ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cits, lack 
of ﬁ  nancial conﬁ  dence and unemployment. 4) Incomes and anti-monopoly policies to limit inﬂ  ation to 
moderate levels, and 5) Targeted credit programs, especially for export-oriented and small and medium sized 
enterprises that can contribute to productivity growth and employment.Central banks as agents of employment creation          13
Th   ese policy proposals in broad outlines are similar to those proposed by Epstein (2006a) for the 
case of South Africa, which, in turn, have been developed in a much broader framework and in more detail 
by Pollin and others (2006).
An Employment Targeted Economic Program for South Africa
In March 2005, to pick one recent, indicative date, South Africa had an unemployment rate of anywhere 
from 26 to 40 per cent, depending on exactly how it is counted. South Africa’s government has pledged to 
cut the unemployment rate by 50 per cent, bringing the oﬃ   cial unemployment rate to 13 per cent by the 
year 2014 (see Pollin and others, 2006: xiii). Pollin and others (2006) developed an “employment-targeted 
economic program” designed to accomplish this goal, with a focus on monetary policy, credit policy, capital 
management techniques, ﬁ  scal policy and industrial policy. Here, ‘employment targeting’ replaces inﬂ  ation 
targeting as the proposed operating principle behind central bank policy, and moderate inﬂ  ation becomes 
an additional constraint which the central bank must take into account when formulating policy (Epstein, 
2006a). 
Under this framework, the central bank, along with other key government institutions, identify an 
employment (or, in this case, an ‘unemployment rate’) target. Th   en, on the basis of models and estimates 
of the South African macro-economy a set of monetary policy instruments are determined—along with 
a number of other policy tools such as credit policy and ﬁ  scal policy—which, together, can achieve the target 
unemployment rate, while maintaining a moderate inﬂ  ation rate and an acceptable level of exchange rate 
variability. In the particular model developed by Epstein in Pollin and others (2006), a simulation model 
shows that if the South African Reserve Bank lowers the interest rate from 11 to 7 per cent and holds it at 
that level for 5 years, economic growth will increase, on average, by 0.5 per cent per year, inﬂ  ation will go up 
by 1 percentage point and the increase in exchange rate variability will be quite modest. In combination with 
other policies, such as credit guarantees and subsidized credit for labour-intensive sectors, as well as capital 
management techniques and incomes policies if necessary, the unemployment rate can be halved by 2014, as 
proposed by the South African government.
Hence, in the case of South Africa, as part of a coherent economic program, an employment-target-
ing central bank apparently can plausibly achieve a signiﬁ  cant reduction in unemployment, while keeping 
inﬂ  ation and exchange rate variability in check (Epstein, 2006a; Pollin and others, 2006).
Summary
Th   e major lesson of these case studies and auxiliary materials is that there are well thought out and plausibly 
viable alternatives to inﬂ  ation targeting that can focus more on important social, real sector outcomes such 
as employment generation, poverty reduction, export promotion and investment enhancement. If inﬂ  ation 
targeting is resilient as the ‘big idea’ of modern central bank policy because many perceive that there is no 
alternative, these case studies provide an antidote by showing that viable alternatives are plausible and can 
be further developed and implemented. Indeed, as I argue in the next section, doing so would be consistent 
with long-standing historical practice.14  DESA Working Paper No. 38
Central Banks as Agents of Economic Development
Th   e employment targeting approach to central bank policy described in the previous section might seem 
quite alien to those schooled in the orthodox tradition of inﬂ  ation targeting and ﬁ  nancial liberalization. In 
fact, policies like those described above have been quite common historically in both currently developed 
and developing countries (Epstein, 2006b). Over the years, central banks have been seen as agents of eco-
nomic development, not just agents of economic stabilization. And while sometimes central banks have 
failed quite spectacularly in this mission, there have been other important success stories, including impor-
tant periods in the U.S., U.K., France, Germany, Japan, South Korea and India, to name just a few exam-
ples. In continental Europe, the banking system, often directed by the central bank in conjunction with the 
ministry of ﬁ  nance, helped to mobilize and direct credit for industrial development (Pollin, 1995; Grabel, 
2000). Even in the U.S. and U.K. these policies were used to direct policy to promote social sectors such as 
housing; in the U.S. and the U.K., central bank policy and regulations were used to promote the ﬁ  nancial 
sector as well (Epstein, 2006b).
As for developing countries, Alice Amsden describes the key role that investment banks played in 
the industrialization success stories such as South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Brazil, Argentina and others, 
in mobilizing and directing savings to key industrial sectors, and in particular those specializing in exports 
(2001). In many of these cases, central banks were a key part of the government apparatus that played a sup-
porting role by maintaining low interest rates, maintaining capital controls to help stabilize exchange rates at 
competitive levels, and sometimes engaging in direct lending for preferred purposes.
In some countries, engaging in these developmental roles, using a wide variety of instruments, was 
widely seen as a key part of the central bank’s mission. After the Second World War, there was a major trans-
formation of central banking in the developing world. In many respects, these changes paralleled those in the 
developed world just described. But in developing countries, central banks were much more emphatically 
agents of economic development than in many richer countries (Epstein, 2006b). As described by the renowned 
monetary historian of the New York Federal Reserve, Arthur I. Bloomﬁ  eld:
During the past decade there has been a marked proliferation and development of central banking 
facilities in the underdeveloped countries of the world, along with an increasing resort to the use of 
monetary policy as an instrument of economic control. Since 1945, central banks have been newly 
established and pre-existing ones thoroughly reorganized, in no less than some twenty-ﬁ  ve underde-
veloped countries. In other cases the powers of pre-existing central banks have been broadened.... in 
large part the recent growth of central banking in the economically backward areas has also reﬂ  ected 
a desire on the part of the governments concerned to be able to pursue a monetary policy designed 
to promote more rapid economic development and to mitigate undue swings in national money 
incomes (Bloomﬁ  eld 1957: 190).
Bloomﬁ  eld goes on to describe the functions, powers, and goals of these central banks:
Many of the central banks, especially those established since 1945 with the help of Federal Reserve 
advisers (emphasis added), are characterized by unusually wide and ﬂ  exible powers. A large number 
of instruments of general and selective credit control, some of a novel character, are provided for. 
Powers are given to the central bank to engage in a wide range of credit operations with commercial 
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cally provided in the hope of enabling the central banks… to pursue a more purposive (emphasis 
added) and eﬀ  ective monetary possible than had been possible for most…. that had been set up… 
during the twenties and thirties… (that) for the most part (had) been equipped with exceeding 
orthodox statutes and limited powers which permitted little scope for a monetary policy designed to 
promote economic development and internal stability (emphasis added) (Bloomﬁ  eld, 1957: 191).
Somewhat surprisingly, from the perspective of today’s ﬁ  nancial orthodoxy, the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York helped to establish developing country central banks and encouraged them to have a 
broad range of monetary and credit powers, especially in contrast to the orthodoxy of the 1920s and 1930s. 
Of course, the Federal Reserve continued to be concerned about the importance of stabilization, controlling 
excessive credit creation and maintaining moderate inﬂ  ation.
But (the central bank’s) eﬀ  orts need not, and in fact should not, stop here. Th   e majority of central 
banks in underdeveloped countries have in actual practice adopted a variety of measures designed more 
eﬀ  ectively to promote the over-all development of their economies. Some of these measures are admittedly 
outside the traditional scope of central banking, but central banking in these countries should not neces-
sarily be evaluated in terms of the standards and criteria applied in the more developed ones…. the central 
bank can seek to inﬂ  uence the ﬂ  ow of bank credit and indeed of savings in directions more in keeping with 
development ends (Bloomﬁ  eld, 1957: 197). 
Bloomﬁ  eld describes the same tools of credit manipulation described earlier with respect to Europe, 
Japan and even the United States:
selective credit controls applied to the banking system, through help in establishing and supporting 
special credit institutions catering to specialized credit needs, and through inﬂ  uence over the lending 
policies of such institutions, it can help to some degree to re-channel real resources in desired direc-
tions, both between the public and private sector and within the private sector itself (Bloomﬁ  eld 
1957: 198).10
While many central banks in developing countries adopted a developmental mission, alongside their 
stabilization objectives, not all of them succeeded in balancing the two. By 1971, Andrew Brimmer of the 
U.S. Federal Reserve Board revisited the issue of central banking in the developing world, and concluded 
that many of these countries had sacriﬁ  ced too much stability for the developmental results achieved (Brim-
mer, 1971). To be sure, there are many cases where central banks in the developing world failed to prevent 
balance of payments crises and excessively high levels of inﬂ  ation, indeed, even hyper-inﬂ  ation.11
Still, there are plenty of examples of success stories, where central banks supported government 
developmental goals, while maintaining key stabilization requirements, often by using a variety of monetary 
instruments, including credit subsidies, capital controls, asset-based reserve requirements, and interest rate 
ceilings. Today, of course, these policies would need to be tailored to modern conditions, as described above. 
But doing so, far from being a novel procedure, would, in fact, be well in the established tradition of central 
banking in both the developed and developing world.
10  Of course, Bloomﬁ  eld (1957: 197) cautions that, “Such measures would for the most part be justiﬁ  ed, 
however, only to the extent that they do not conﬂ  ict with the overriding requirement of ﬁ  nancial stability 
or involve the central bank in details of a sort that might distract its attention and energies from the 
eﬀ  ective implementation of a policy aimed at stability” .
11 See  Maxﬁ  eld (1997) and Fry (1995) for a discussion of some of these cases.16  DESA Working Paper No. 38
Conclusion
Mentioned earlier was the resilience of inﬂ  ation targeting despite the common target misses; and also men-
tioned was the expressed desire of many developing countries to adopt inﬂ  ation targeting despite its apparent 
success in reducing inﬂ  ation or promoting economic growth, employment creation or poverty reduction. 
Th   is chapter has argued that this inﬂ  ation targeting ‘fad’, supported with technical assistance by the IMF, 
is far from benign. It creates in central banks a culture of inﬂ  ation focus, or even inﬂ  ation obsession. Mil-
lions of dollars are spent studying every aspect of inﬂ  ation, but few aspects of unemployment; thousands of 
hours of the time of highly scarce, skilled economists are spent pouring over complex models designed to 
show how to get inﬂ  ation down from 8 to 4 per cent, but not on how to create more and better jobs; and if 
other government oﬃ   cials or those in civil society ask the central bank to do something about employment 
creation, the central banks can respond, “that’s not our job”. 
More than anything else, the cost of inﬂ  ation-focused monetary regimes is to divert the attention of 
the some of the most highly trained and skilled economists and policy makers in developing countries away 
from the tasks that previous generations of central bankers took for granted as being their main job: to help 
their countries develop, to create jobs, and to foster socially productive economic growth. It is time to return 
to an earlier generation of central banking where central banks were seen as agents of economic develop-
ment, including as agents of employment creation. But, it is always crucial to keep in mind this modern les-
son: Central banks must balance their developmental goals with the crucial task of macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion. Otherwise, both stabilization and development will be lost.
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